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Norms and National Security:
The WTO as a Catalyst for Inquiry
Ryan Goodman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Multilateral treaties often include a national security exception as an opt-out
mechanism for a state party to free itself of constraints otherwise imposed by the
agreement. The standard view is that such "escape clauses" allow states to elevate their
security interests above international commitments and, thereby, evade international
obligations. A state's invocation of such a provision is, therefore, generally viewed as a
retreat from compliance with international norms. The standard account goes like
this:
National security is the Achilles' heel of international law. Wherever international
law is created, the issue of national security gives rise to some sort of loophole, often
in the form of an explicit national security exception. The right of any nation-stare
to protect itself in times of serious crisis by employing otherwise unavailable means
has been a bedrock feature of the international [egal system. As long as the notion of
sovereignty exerts power within this evolving system, national security wll be an
element o, as an exception to, the applicable international law.'
Recent US practice before the World Trade Organization ('V/TO") appears to
confirm this view. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
effectively restricts a states ability to enact unilateral economic sanctions, unless the
action fits within an enumerated exception. Article XXI provides one of those
exceptions; it stipulates that a state can opt out of GATT requirements for actions
taken to protect "essential security interests. 2 The United States has invoked this
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1. Hannes L Schloemann and Stefan Ohlhoff, 'Constitutionalization and Disutc Sattleent n t&: ITOi .
National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AmJ Intl L 424, 426 (1999).
2. Article XXI provides:
Security Exceptions
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
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provision on two occasions-to defend the Helms-Burton secondary boycott against
Cuba and the Massachusetts selective purchasing law against Burma. The United
States argued, in part, that these measures served its security interests because they
responded directly to human rights violations committed by the respective regimes.
Many commentators view this position as another instance of US resistance to, and
the breakdown of, international legal norms.
In this brief essay, I argue that, in principle, the United States' position involves a
wholly legitimate definition of "security interests" and that the US stance, rather than
representing a retreat from international legal norms, reflects and contributes to them.
In making this claim, I rely on the legal and social history following World War II
that has integrated into the concept of security interests a concern for human rights
conditions in other countries. Based on this history, I submit that the US invocation
of the particular defense-that another state's severe mistreatment of its citizens
threatens US security interests-accords with emergent international norms. Of
course, the US taking this position before the WTO may diminish compliance with
international trading obligations. However, the dimension that I explore here-
consistency with and furtherance of robust international norms of security-should
be taken into account in rendering any broad assessment of the relationship between
the US actions and international norms. Indeed, I use the opportunity of this essay to
suggest a few implications this particular dimension has for understanding the
construction and operation of international norms more generally.'
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it
considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and such
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly for the purpose of
supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting parry from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
GATT, 55 UNTS 194, TIAS No 1700 (1947). GATT 1947 is incorporated into GATT
1994. See GATT 1994, Arc 1(a) (Apr 15, 1994) 33 ILM 1125, 1154 (1994). See also
North American Free Trade Agreement, Art 2102 (1993), 32 ILM 605 (1993) (using
same language).
3. As this description of my argument suggests, I adopt a constructivist approach in carrying out this
analysis. By saying that, I mean to invoke sociological works such as Martha Finnemores and
Alexander Wendt's. Finnemore provides a useful description of the constructivist perspective:
State interests are defined in the context of internationally held norms and
understandings about what is good and appropriate. That normative context influences
the behavior of decisionmakers and of mass publics who may choose and constrain those
decisionmakers. The normative context also changes over time, and as internationally
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While the WTO controversy mainly provides the occasion for starting such a
discussion, it is also important to analyze the discussion's particular importance for
the WTO. Let me first address some of those issues before examining the broader
theme of normative constructions of security and human rights.
I. SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE WTO
My analysis of the normative scope of security interests is relevant to a number of
international agreements, but it has special significance for the WTO. First, many
were concerned that the US government's recent invocations of the national security
exception tore at the fabric of the WTO. A number of states, policymakers, and
scholars criticized the United States on the ground that its proffered concerns
exceeded the definition of security interests.4 Some commentators even suggested that
the US argument was not exercised in good faith.5 Whether the stance taken by the
United States is a fair invocation of the national security exception is, therefore, an
especially timely and intense topic of concern to the WTO. This essay helps resolve
one element of that debate.
Second, although a US appearance before a WTO panel was avoided on these
two previous occasions,6 the issue can be expected to return. Over the last several
decades, the United States has often resorted to unilateral human rights sanctions,
and it can be expected to do so again.' We should accordingly anticipate not only
held norms and values change, they create coordinated shifts in state interests and
behavior across the system.
Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society 2 (Cornell 196). See aL-o id at 3
(attributing influence of sociology to development of this area of scholarship); Alexander Wendt.
Social Theory of International Politics 1 (Cambridge 1999) ("The version of constr-crivism that I
defend is a moderate one that draws especially on structurationist and symbolic interactionist
sociology. As such it concedes important points to materialist and individualistic pespeiv.").
4. Consider Joseph V. W2aker, The Legality of &e Secondary Boycotts Contairrd in d-: Hehns.Burton Act
Under International Law, 3 DePaul Dig Intl L 1, 8 (1997); FrankJ. Garcia, Th: G .bal Market and
Human Rigbts: Trading Au'ay the Human Rights Principle, 25 Brooklynj Intl Law 51 (1999).
5. Consider Riyaz Datu andJohn Boscariol, GATT Article XX. Helms-Burton and the Continuirg Abuse
of the National Security Exception, 28 Can Bus LJ 198,207-08 (1997); I.eslie R. Goldberg, Trade Pcq
and Election-Year Policie. The Truth About Title III of the Helms.Burton Act, 18 NwJ Intl L & Bus 217,
239 (1997).
6. In the Helms-Burton case, President Clinton brokered a political deal with allies in return for their
suspending the WTO complaint. In the Burma case, the WVTO complaint was rendered moor by
an intervening US Supreme Court decision, which invalidated the legislation.
7. Admittedly, the present Administration will likely scale back the use of sanctions, as indicated by
Secretary of State Colin Powel's nomination hearings. George Gedda, Pots'el Wants Time Oit on
Sanctions, 2001 WL 11948187 (Jan 31, 2001). This, however, does not mean the elimination of
sanctions as a foreign policy tool in all circumstances. Id (As for Cuba, Powell said ... 'It is
President Bush's intention to keep the sanctions in place.-). Nor does it control for the inclinations
of Congress or future Administrations.
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another dispute on this issue arising, but the possibility of one eventually coming
before a WTO panel.
Third, the scope of the security exception is important to US lawmakers in
determining the range of permissible actions under GATT. Consider the recent
deliberations over Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China. During the
congressional debates, many expressed concern that China's admission to the WTO
would cripple the US government's ability to enact trade sanctions in response to
human rights violations committed by the People's Republic of China. The general
assumption was that GATT eliminated this option.
Fourth, recent decisions by dispute settlement bodies have narrowed the scope of
exceptions under Article XX, thus forcing the United States to depend more heavily
on Article XXI's security exception in future cases. In 1998, the Appellate Body of the
WTO held that Article XX's nondiscrimination clause requires trade measures to
include transparent and predictable procedures, least restrictive alternatives, and
safeguards against overinclusive application.8 Earlier panel decisions, which invalidated
US measures dealing with dolphin-safe tuna harvesting, also interpreted Article XX
narrowly. In 1991, a panel held that Article XX's exemption for actions taken "to
protect human, animal or plant life or health" concerned only animals within a state's
own jurisdiction.9 And, in 1994, a panel held that a US tuna embargo did not satisfy
Article XX because it was designed not to achieve environmental goals directly, but to
coerce other governments into adopting specific environmental policies."0 Although
neither panel decision was adopted, they both indicate restrictive interpretations of
Article XX that WTO dispute settlement bodies may apply in the future.
Fifth, if a US sanction is challenged before a WTO panel, the panel may reach
the merits of a proffered national security justification. One school of thought is that
mere invocation of the Article XXI national security exception is a discretionary right
of states not reviewable by a WTO panel." Another school, however, maintains that
jurisdiction cannot be stripped so easily and that a WTO panel has the authority to
review the merits of various aspects of a state's Article XXI justification. 2 Still, even if
the first school is correct and a WTO panel declines jurisdiction, other states'
perceptions of the merits of the US position will have considerable effects on the
viability of the institution. More broadly, the persuasiveness of the US position will
8. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Import Probibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products by the United States, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12, 1998).
9. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 39 GATT BISD 155, 198 (1993).
10. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna by the United States, 1994 WL 907620, para 5.23 (May 20, 1994).
11. Raj Bhala, National Security and International Trade Law: What the GA7T Says and What the United
States Does, 19 U PaJ Intl Econ L 263, 268-69 (1998).
12. Schloemann and Ohlhoff, 93 AmJ Ind L (cited in note 1).
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shape general perceptions of US willingness and reliability in conforming to
international rules and standards of practice.
Before proceeding to Part Ilrs discussion of the norms of security and human
rights, I should register one caveat. There are a number of different components to
the national security exception under Article XXL and the argument I pursue here is
agnostic on whether Helms-Burton or similar measures meet these other elements.
Indeed, one of the valuable aspects of a recent article by Hannes Schloemann and
Stefan Ohlhoff is the authors' care in distinguishing Article XXI's different
components.' They contend, for example, that a WTO panel has some, though
limited, authority to review a state's claim that particular concerns constitute "essential
security interests." They separately argue that a panel has broader authority to review
whether the action taken was "necessary"-and, in turn, proportional-to address
those interests (Article XXI(b)) and whether the action occurred "in time of... [an]
international emergency in international relations" (Article XXI(b)(iii)). They also
submit that a panel has authority to apply a good faith test in reviewing whether a
state genuinely considered the particular matter (for example, Cuba's behavior) a
threat to the concerns that the sanctioning state identifies as a security interest. By
illustration, one might conclude that (A) particular human rights violations constitute
a threat to security, but (B) the United States did not genuinely consider Cuba's
actions threatening to that particular range of security interests or Helms-Burton was
not a necessary, or proportional, response. This essay discusses issues under category
A, and takes no position on issues under category B.
Such distinctions are relevant not only to how a panel might decide a case, but
also to how observers-including scholars, policymakers, and other governments-
consider the issues. Many opponents of Helms-Burton believe the legislation was
grossly disproportionate or motivated by illegitimate ideological convictions. A
number of these commentators, however, go too far by issuing a point-by-point
criticism of the US position-including criticism of the US stance linking human
rights and security. In doing so, many of these critics are not careful to differentiate
the various components of the US claim. It is important, however, not to misjudge a
legitimate aspect of the US position, even though the other reasons for opposing
Helms-Burton may be well-founded.
III. THE CONSTRUCTION OF SECURITY
Over time the international community has arrived at the view that a certain
severity and extent of human rights violations internal to a country constitute a threat
to international security. Aspects of this development can be traced back to the
treaties of Westphalia, which included provisions concerning respect for the rights of
13. Schloemann and Ohloff, 93 AmJ Ind L 424 (cired in note 1).
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religious minorities as part of an effort to create regional stability and peace between
nations.'4 The universalization of that principle and its extension to individual rights
and other minority groups is, however, mostly a 20th century phenomenon."
Foundations for the contemporary link between individual human rights and
security were introduced during the framing of the United Nations Charter and the
creation of the rest of the post-World War II architecture for peace. In a technical
sense, one could point to clear textual linkages between human rights and security in
postwar international documents as evidence enough that the US human rights-
security argument is plausible. The depth of the commitment to those textual
statements, however, did not arise until the international community squarely
confronted the two competing goals of the United Nations: (1) the prohibition
against intervention; and (2) the protection of universal human rights. While
Nuremberg provided the initial groundwork for a principled compromise between
these competing objectives-that state sovereignty cannot shield a government from
international intervention when it commits atrocities against its own citizens-the
practice implementing that solution did not follow until the end of the Cold War.
Once the East-West rivalry receded, certain multilateral initiatives could be realized,
and, in turn, the norm linking human rights and security more firmly established.
The various sources that demonstrate the human rights-security linkage are not
so clear on the specific reasoning underlying that connection. The sources analyzed in
the following discussion indicate three variants: (1) a regime committing widespread
and severe human rights violations heralds a threat to harmony among nations; (2) the
level and severity of the violations produce substantial destabilizing effects on
proximate states such as refugee-related emergencies; and (3) such violations
constitute an offence against humanity and thus a threat to international peace. In the
following discussion, I analyze various sources that support each of these three
variants. It should go without saying that a source can show strong evidence of one
variant, but also support another, as these linkages are not mutually exclusive and, in
various contexts, will surely overlap.
A. VARIANT 1: REGIME AS A THREAT
A state campaign to conduct widespread and severe human rights violations
against sectors of its population has been viewed as a precursor to, as well as indicative
of, aggression against other states and hostility among nations. Justice Jackson's report
to the President in the context of the Nuremberg trials reflects this perception:
14. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 79-82 (Princeton 1999).
15. David Wippman, Te Evolution and Implementation of Minority Rights, 66 Fordham L Rev 597, 599-
602 (1997) (describing schemes for protecting minority rights under the League of Nations).
Vo 2 o. I
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Our people... witnessed persecution of the greatest enormity on religious, political
and racial grounds, the breakdown of trade unions, and the liquidation of all
religious and moral influences. This was not the legitimate activity of a state within
its own boundaries, but was preparatory to the launching of an international course
of aggression and was with the evil intention, openly expressed by the Nazis, of
capturing the form of the German state as an instrumentality for spreading their
rule to other countries.
The modern connection between gross human rights violations and a threat to
international peace is based in large part on the particularities of the confrontation
with fascism and Hider's crimes of aggression. A view emerged out of World War II
that a government's concerted attack against racial and ethnic minorities was deeply
connected to hostility towards national groups and other nations.
This sensibility is expressed, for example, in the Constitution of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO"), one of the
earliest postwar institutions. The Preamble of the UNESCO Constitution states:
"[T]he great and terrible war which has now ended was a war made possible by the
denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men,
and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the
doctrine of the inequality of men and races." Correspondingly, Article I of
UNESCO's Constitution states: "[t]he purpose of the Organization is to contribute
to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through
education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the
rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms."
Subsequent international agreements evince a similar view of the connection
between systematic attacks against internal populations and hostility among nations.
Instruments with a focus on human rights reference the link to international security,
while instruments with a focus on international security reference the link to human
rights. As for the former, the 1978 Declaration and Program of Action for the first
World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination states: "All forms of
discrimination... based on the theory of racial superiority, exclusiveness or hatred are
a violation of fundamental human rights and jeopardize friendly relations among
peoples, co-operation between nations, and international peace and security." As for
the latter, the 1970 Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security states
that the General Assembly "[s]olemnly reaffirms that universal respect for and full
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the elimination of the
violation of those rights are urgent and essential to the strengthening of international
security, and hence resolutely condemns all forms of oppression, tyranny and
discrimination, particularly racism and racial discrimination, wherever they occur.""'
16. Report of Robert H.Jackson to the President, 12 Dep St Bull 1071 (June 10,1945).
17. United Nations, Declaration on the Strengthening of International Seuurii, A/RES/2734 (XXV)
(1970).
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Neither of these documents has achieved significant salience long after its
promulgation." They do, however, reflect a sense of the international community's
conceptual connection between the categories at issue.
It is difficult to sort out all the connections between human rights and security
that transpired during the Cold War, as many civil and political rights were sacrificed
at the altar of so-called military necessity and political interest. Still, for the United
States, a significant aspect of Cold War foreign policy involved the human rights-
security variant described here. The geopolitical conflict was, in essence, a rivalry
between competing models of governance. In the US perception, the Marxist-Leninist
model was antithetical to the American way of life: it entailed religious persecution,
elimination of political freedoms, and rejection of basic property rights. The United
States regarded the spread of Communism as a threat to its security interests and
employed overt and covert means to safeguard and expand the alignment of states in
the Western camp.
The human rights-security link was also based on the fact that the Soviet Union
and its client states associated their own national security with the elimination of
internal political dissent. As with China today, these regimes considered human rights
organizations and the publication of domestic human rights reports to be direct
threats to the state's survival. With such an internal security mindset, it was
impossible for the West to consider human rights conditions in these countries
outside the prism of geopolitics and international security.
The transition from the Cold War to present-day geopolitics has maintained
significant continuity in the concern for internal human rights conditions. First, in
terms of the warming of American-Soviet relations, human rights featured as a key
component of d6tente; and significant agreement on civil and political rights issues in
the Helsinki process (especially at the Vienna Review Conference in 1989) was viewed
as one of the first signs that the Cold War was coming to an end. Second, in terms of
post-Cold War alignments, a dimension of US and Western European foreign policy
has been grounded in the belief that liberal states do not go to war with each other
and are generally more likely to foster peace and security. Leading proponents of this
theory define a liberal state to include not only democratic elections but also respect
18. The Declaration on International Security, however, has been reaffirmed in General Assembly
Resolutions over the years. One principle that is repeated in these subsequent resolutions is that
"respect for and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms in their civil, political,
economic, social and cultural aspects, on the one hand, and the strengthening of international peace
and security, on the other, mutually reinforce each other." See, for example, United Nations, Review
of the Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengtbening of International Security, A/RES/44/126
(Dec 15, 1989). In 1983, the Second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial
Discrimination reaffirmed the principle linking international security and racial discrimination.
The 2001 draft text of the Third World Conference Against Racism does the same.
'cov.2 N'o. i
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for basic human rights.19 Accordingly, democracy-building projects featured in the US
national security agenda are now combined with attention to safeguarding human
rights.' The old security concerns associated with competing models of communism
and capitalism have thus been replaced by a new opposition-liberal versus nonliberal
forms of governance-with human rights beginning to figure more prominently as a
dimension along which such lines are drawn.
Finally, in terms of political statements, the Office of the UN Secretary General
has articulated the post-Cold War concern for human rights in reference to the UN
Charter's original understanding of human rights as central to the maintenance of
international peace. In the 1991 Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the
Organization, Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuelar called the protection of
human rights "one of the keystones in the arch of peace."n In the 1992 Report,
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated, "respect for human rights is dearly
important in order to maintain international peace and security."" In 1999, Secretary
General Kofi Annan stated:
As we review what has been achieved since 1945, we can see how right the drafters
of the Charter were to link human rights and the maintenance of peace and security.
Today, with 50 years of experience behind us, we can reaffirm the crucial
orance of that link. Our experience has also taught us that respect for human
ights is crucial to peace-building, and to the broader task ofensuring developmenr.2s
19. Consider Anne-Marie Slaughter, Intenational Law in a Word of Literal Sfates, 6 EurJ Ind L 503,
509 (1995).
Liberal States are States with some form of representative democracy, a market economy
based on private property rights, and constitutional protections of civil and political
rights. These States are lai less likely to go to war with one another than the), are to o to
war with non-liberal States, giving rise to what some scholars have termed the liferal
peace.
20. Consider White House-National Security Council, A National Scunty Strategy for a New Cenury 25
(Dec 1999):
Our security depends upon the protection and expansion of democracy worldwide ...
Lasting democracy also requires respect for human rights, including the right to political
dissent, freedom of religion and beliefi, an independent media capable of engaging an
informed citizenry, a robust civil society; the rule of law and an independent judiairy;
open and competitive economic structures; mechanisms to safeguard minorities from
oppressive rule by the majority; full respect for womens and workers' rights; and civilian
control of the military.
21. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-Geeral on te Work of tl: Orantzation, UN Doc GA/46/404
(1991), reprinted in 45 UNYB 3,7 (1991).
22. United Nations, Report of the Srretay-General on the Worlk of t:e Organattn, UN Do: GA/47/407
(1992), reprinted in 46 UNYB 3,16 (1992).
23. See, United Nations, World Conference Against Racism, available online at
<http://www.un.orglrights/racism/factsl.hrm> (visited Mar 25, 2001).
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B. VARIANT 2: INSTABILITY AS A THREAT
A government's practice of gross human rights violations often produces external
harms to neighboring states, such as massive refugee flows, and the normative
development linking such conditions to a threat to peace and security has been
expressed through institutional responses. Here, I discuss two stro.Ig indications of
the norm's solidification as reflected in (i) a succession of Security Council decisions
and (ii) recent institutional initiatives of the European Union.
This variant of the link between security and human rights is perhaps most
evident in a series of Security Council decisions involving human rights-related
concerns. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council may adopt
enforcement measures if it decides a situation constitutes a threat to international
peace and security. Primarily over the last decade, the Council expanded the scope of
such threats to include human rights atrocities involving cross-border harms.
This was a break from the past. As Bruno Simma explains, the original
understanding of the Charter was that only interstate conflicts could trigger Chapter
VII powets. 4 The UN confrontation with the white minority regime in Southern
Rhodesia marked the first break towards a more expansive conception of threats to
peace and security. From there, the Council has since decided a threat to peace and
security includes the following internal human rights-related crises with a nexus to
cross-border instability: civil war (for example, Somalia and Yugoslavia); military coup
(for example, Haiti and Sierra Leone); repression of a civilian population (for
example, Iraq's abuses against the Kurds); and genocide (for example, Rwanda).
My classification of these decisions diverges from that of international law
scholars who take some of the Security Council decisions to mean that massive
human rights violations without any effect on external instability constitute a threat to
international peace and security.2 I disagree with this view at least in terms of the text
of the Security Council decisions. On each occasion that the Security Council has
decided a situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, the
Council has noted a nexus with interstate instability such as mass refugee flows.
One objection might be that human rights violations are, then, irrelevant to the
determination of a threat to international peace and security, because each of the
Council's decisions has depended on external instability. This objection does not go
very far for two reasons. First, the relevant factor in each of these decisions is the
presence of gross human rights violations. On each occasion, the Council has
24. Bruno Simma, ed, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 608 (Oxford 1994).
25. Richard Falk, The Complexities of Humanitarian Intervention: A New World Order Challenge, 17 Mich J
Intl L 491 (1996); Richard B. Lillich, The Role of the UN Security Council In Protecting Human Rights in
Crisis Situations: UN Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, 3 Tul J Intl & Comp L 1
(1994).
cWorns andflfationafSecuriy
appeared most concerned, if not preoccupied, with the human rights violations, and
these violations form a key aspect of the decision to adopt Chapter VII enforcement
measures. It is not as though the Council has decided situations involving merely
refugee flows constitute a threat to international peace and security without a nexus to
such human rights violations. Second, the principal motivating factor for the Council's
decision is so clearly the existence of mass atrocities that some who deny the existence
of a human rights-security link maintain that "it appears that the Security Council's
use of massive refugee flows to establish the existence of a threat to international peace
and security has been a pretense to intervene in internal situations that involve gross
violations of human rights:"' Accordingly, in this situation, we may actually have a
norm not fully expressed through rhetoric and text, but through institutional
decisions that de facto consider mass human rights violations a threat to international
peace and security.
Recent institutional developments within the European Union ("EU") offer
independent evidence of discursive and institutionalized links between human rights
and security. In the past decade, European states have dealt directly with massive
refugee flows and other forms of regional instability resulting from human rights
atrocities committed in neighboring states. The conceptual understanding of
contemporary security interests has developed to encompass widespread human rights
violations in other countries, and corresponding institutional reforms have followed.
Two examples indicate the nature of these developments: the Stability Pact for South
Eastern Europe and the European rapid-reaction force.
Both of these initiatives were spurred in significant part by the logic of the
second variant's concern over instability caused by severe human rights violations and,
consequently, each incorporates a sense of the variant within its institutional design.
The EU launched the Stability Pact-sometimes popularly called the Security
Pact-for South Eastern Europe during the Kosovo crisis. The originating idea was
to stabilize frontline states in Milosevic's neighborhood. A prominent feature of the
pact is the commitment to institution-building in the context of individual and
minority group rights. This specifically includes intergovernmental training programs,
sponsorship of media freedom, assistance with obtaining support from the
international donor community, and progressive integration of South Eastern states
into both the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE") and
the Council of Europe's human rights institutions. These programs serve the overall
objectives of the Pact, which are expressly defined in terms of building friendly
relations and regional stability.-
26. C. Todd Piczak, The Helms.Burton Act: US Foregn Policy Toward Cuba, t National Suunty E.ceptlan
to the GATT and the Political Question Doctrine, 61 U Pitt L Rev 287, 315 (1999).
27. European Union, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, aailable online ar
<hrp://wvw.europa.eu.inr/comm/extemal-reaions/se/s/apacr/lO-june_9.hrm> (%isited Mar
25,2001).
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The EU has also committed itself to developing a rapid-reaction force, motivated
in large part by a concern that the United States may have a higher threshold of
tolerance for human rights violations and other threats to security in the European
theater. The rapid-reaction force will provide 60,000 military personnel, drawn from
EU member states and sustainable for up to one year in an international mission. The
initiative draws inspiration from lessons learned in the face of genocide in the former
Yugoslavia. Accordingly, the rapid-reaction force's mandate includes performing
humanitarian operations, intervening to prevent conflicts from erupting, and
undertaking peacekeeping efforts. As a demonstration of the link between local rule of
law issues and regional stability, the commitment to a rapid-reaction force has recently
been followed by a supplemental commitment by EU member states to provide up to
5,000 police officers for international missions as well.
C. VARIANT 3: OFFENCE ITSELF AS A THREAT
The third variant of the human rights-security link is based on the conception of
grave human rights violations as an offence against the international community.
Particular violations-for example, genocide and crimes against humanity-rise to
the level of an international delict that other states have the prerogative, and
sometimes obligation, to respond to with force. Such human rights violations are now
considered a threat to international security due to (a) the development of a norm that
these violations are an attack against the basic foundation of humanity and harmony
among nations, and (b) the development of a norm accepting external intervention by
other states to halt such offenses. Therefore, this variant of the link is based on the
ontological construction of the scope of the violations' harms and the acceptance of
armed intervention as a lawful response to their occurrence.
This variant can be traced back to earlier justifications for humanitarian
intervention of a more limited scope. Martha Finnemore argues that the normative
focus of Western humanitarian intervention expanded over the centuries from a
concern for persecution of Christians in foreign countries to a concern for all human
beings abroad.' Indeed, the Peace of Westphalia's attention to particular religious
minorities is part of the historical roots of that normative lineage. While the third
variant has expanded to include severe human rights violations against individuals
unrelated to their membership in a particular classificatory group, aspects of the
narrower scope remain. Majority ethnic groups in certain states share ethno-national
affiliations with minority groups in neighboring states (especially in South Eastern
28. Martha Finnemore, Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, in PeterJ. Katzenstcin, ed, The
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics at 153 (Columbia 1996).
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Europe and the Horn of Africa), and the severe mistreatment of those minorities is a
tinderbox for conflict.'
At its broadest level, the modem development of the third variant is dearly
reflected in the codification of international criminal law. Consider, for example, the
International Law Commission's ("ILC') work on crimes against international peace
and security. The ILC's 1954 Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind listed twelve categories of substantive offenses. Eight of these dearly
related to hostilities between states such as acts or threats of aggression, terrorist
activities, and illegal annexation of another state's territory. One concerned violations
of arms control treaties. One involved violations of the laws of war. The final two
"offences against the peace and security of mankind," related exclusively to mass
human rights violations: genocide and crimes against humanity. The ILCs 1996 Draft
Code maintains this general classificatory system. Although the ILC is composed of
independent experts, its articulation of international law on this subject is supported
by the Rome Treaty for an International Criminal Court ("ICC'). The ICC treaty
includes jurisdiction over four offences-aggression, war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity-and the treaty's preamble makes no distinction in its
"recogni[tion] that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security, and well-being of
the world." Signed by 139 states and ratified by 29 states as of February 12, 2001, the
ICC treaty reflects prevailing international sentiment in this regard.
Finally, the norm is also reflected in the Genocide Convention, and, through the
obligations contained therein, it has influenced both the United States' ability and
failure to act in various situations. In terms of ability to act, the genocide in Northern
Iraq has lent legitimacy to certain US military measures against the Iraqi government.
The US has been sure to refer to the Kurdish genocide to legitimize these military
efforts and thereby contain international criticism. Conversely, in terms of failure to
act, during the first period of the Rwanda genocide, the US Department of State was
jarringly reluctant to call the situation a "genocide" because such a statement would
trigger international obligations. Additionally, in the aftermath of the genocide, the
official apologies by President Clinton and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
reflected the importance the norm held and the shame felt in not measuring up to it.
The historic failure of the international community to stop the genocide has also led
to a remarkable number of formal commissions of inquiry at the national (for
example, France and Belgium), regional (for example, the Organization of African
Unity), and international (for example, the Office of the UN Secretary General)
levels. In short, both the Iraq and Rwanda cases indicate the norm's influence on
29. See Steven . Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?. 32 NYU J Ind L &
Polk 591, 599 (2000) (discussing features of this dynamic in terms set forth in Rogers Brubaker.
Nationalism Reftamed. Nationhood and the National Question in t&e New EuroFC (Cambridge 1996)).
Springq 2001
go ofm a n
Cbicasojournalof internationa(Law
degrees of freedom in constraining or supporting particular state behaviors. While the
obligations under the Genocide Convention also provide evidence of the norm, these
cases demonstrate the norm's embeddedness in international relations and state
practice.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
At a narrow level, the above discussion demonstrates how the US invocation of
the human rights-security link comports with international normative developments.
At a broader level, it points to the ongoing reconstruction of aspects of the world
community based on the deep perceptual connection between internal human rights
conditions and security. Lessons can be drawn from this discussion to advance our
understanding of the ways international norms operate. In this remaining part, I take
up these concerns by offering a few suggestions on this study's relevance to
understanding: (1) the indirect influence norms exert on state identity and interests
through changes made in institutions; (2) the direct influence norms exert on state
identity and interests; and (3) the significance of instability in norm construction,
maintenance, and decline.
A. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The emergent human rights-security norm has already produced significant
effects in the creation and design of international institutions. Consider a few
examples. As indicated above, UNESCO was one of the first international
institutions shaped by the post-World War II conception of the human rights-
security link. Similarly, a recent study by Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell concludes
that institutional changes in the OSCE-such as the creation of the High
Commissioner on National Minorities and "missions of long duration'-reflect deep
normative links between security, a sense of a community of liberal nations, and
internal human rights conditions.' As another example, the post-Cold War
mechanisms established by the United Nations to conduct peacekeeping in crisis areas
now regularly feature a human rights component within their mandate (for example,
UNAMSIL [Sierra Leone], UNMIBH [Bosnia and Herzegovina], UNTAC
(Cambodia], and ONUSAL [El Salvador]). Furthermore, institutional reforms in
other settings have been prompted by the international community's failure in the
Rwanda crisis. The national and international commissions of inquiry that studied the
Rwanda debacle have each suggested various institutional reforms including:
formalized and more transparent early warning systems, the creation or strengthening
30. Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell, Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the
Construction' of Security in Post-Cold War Europe, 53 Intl Org 505 (1999).
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of regional military forces (for example, ECOMOG), and changes in rules of
engagement to protect civilian lives.
As one final example, consider the effect of the human rights-security link in the
establishment of the last international institution created during the 20th century: the
ICC. One might posit that the strength of "international human rights issue
networks"31 and norm entrepreneurs in helping bring about the ICC drew significant
support from the cultural salience and persuasiveness of the conception that certain
atrocities, wherever committed, are an affront to humanity at large. The ICC, indeed,
marks a distinct trend in support of the third variant of the human rights-security
link. Its historical antecedent-the Nuremberg Tribunal-required a link between
human rights violations and the crime of aggression, at least for purposes of
jurisdiction. In contrast, the ICC treats each of the crimes separately and allows the
quasi-independent prosecutor to take up cases of genocide and crimes against
humanity without any other threat across international borders. Indeed, the final text
of the statute was adopted at Rome without the crime of aggression provision even
being completed," and states have seen fit to ratify the statute without it.
Given the above, it is fair to conclude that if norms help shape the creation and
design of such institutions, those norms may be said to affect state behavior at least
indirectly. The human rights-security norm, for example, by helping create the
position for and shaping the mandate of the OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities has, in turn, influenced the management of interethnic relations within
countries under the High Commissioner's mandate, the integration of those countries
into the liberal European regional institutions, and foreign ministries' awareness of
and responses to conflicts in the area." As another example of practical effects,
consider the norm's influence in incorporating human rights mandates into United
Nations peacekeeping operations such as UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone). This
institutional design necessitates particular human rights-related processes and
31. Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Principle Lsuc-Networ&s, and Sovereignty in Latin Amea. 47 Ind Org
411, 440 (1993) (distinguishing -transnational relations motivated by shared values or principled
ideas-beliefs about what is right or wrong (issue-networks)" from "rransnational relations
motivated by shared causal ideas (epistemic communities)"); s also Martha Finnemore and
Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm D)nanics and Politica C.ange, 52 Intl Org 887. 90603 (1993)
(discussing appeal and success of particular norms based on their intrinsic characteristics).
32. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art 5(2), available online at
<gophe://gopher.igc.org/O0/orgs/icc/undocs/rome/romesrature.=t> (,visited Mar 25, 2001).
('The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in
accordance with articles 121 ['Amendments] and 123 ('Review ofthe Statute") defining the crime
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercisejurisdiction with respect to this
crimef-.
33. See, for example, CSCE Hsinki Docunent 1992: C:al!enges of Change, available online at
<http://wvm.osce.org/docs/english/1990.1999/summits/hels92e.htr>, pars 12 (confidence-
building measures); pard 13 (early warning procedures); see also Ratner, 32 NYUJ Ind L & Polr
(cited in note 29) (analyzing High Commissioner's importance as a norm mediator promoting
minority rights protection and reducing ethnic tension in various countries).
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measurements of success in nation-building efforts under the UN's mandate. In short,
as the norm is accepted at the stage of institutional design, the consequences of those
institutional arrangements will necessarily influence the direction of efforts, resources,
and cognitive understandings of human rights and security concerns in numerous
settings.
B. STATES' INTERESTS AND IDENTITIES
The acceptance and reiteration of the human rights-security norm may also
affect structural dimensions of the world community by more directly shaping states'
interests and identities. The US human rights-security stance, in particular, helps set
the relationship not only with regard to direct targets (for example, Burma and Cuba),
but with respect to third parties as well. If the world is indeed heading towards a
"culture of collective security," 4 US leadership in delineating and supporting the idea
of particular states as security threats due to their human rights record has important
ramifications. It signals to partners such as the EU the scope of interests that will be
managed in their joint efforts and relationships. It also signals to other states the
dimensions of liberalism that are necessary to earn perceptual membership in the so-
called "community of nations."
This form of signaling to third parties can be effective in encouraging
governments to regulate their own behavior for fear of either enforcement actions or
reputational costs. For example, the government of Indonesia incorporates such
information in determining the margin of discretion it has to quell secessionist
movements without crossing a threshold of concern set by US security interests and,
by extension, those of the Security Council. Consider, as another example, former
Croatian President Tudjman's eagerness to be accepted as a member the community
of liberal nations. It was widely understood that Croatia's cooperativeness with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and implementation of
domestic political reforms reflected Tudjman's efforts to evince common interests
with the United States and Western Europe-to act like a liberal democratic state is
supposed to act. Rather than a target of the OSCE's human rights-security concerns,
Croatia preferred to be a cooperative member identifying and addressing such
concerns. As the leader of the free world, the US position on these matters, even if
primarily in rhetoric, is information such governments and political leaders
incorporate and their countries consequently internalize through domestic legislative
reform and changes in public policy.
34. Id at 314.
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C. NORM INSTABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION
From a constructivist perspective, the degree of support for the shift towards a
human rights-security link is important as it indicates the sedimentation and
durability of the norm. The WTO debate, in particular, potentially exposes a
weakness in this constructivist account. Because norms are built on shared
understandings, how can we explain the fact that the US invocation of the human
rights-security link in the WTO context met with such disapproval? In even stronger
terms, a critic might argue that the WTO controversy indicates the norm is hollow.
While there is some merit to this objection, I believe it can be effectively
answered through refinement and clarification of the constructivist account of norm
development. First, from a constructivist perspective, one should anticipate certain
levels of instability in the formation and maintenance of norms. The negative reaction
in the context of the WTO simply suggests the possibility of an underlying fragility of
the norm and the need for its continual reinforcement." Norms only reach a point of
solidification for a period of time. During their emergence and decline, they are
necessarily unsettled. Second, the WTO controversy may reveal a measure of
indeterminacy in the human rights-security norm. Indeed, the fact that this essay has
had to detail the content and scope of the norm indicates current deficiencies in the
norms recognition and definition. The US reliance on the norm in the two WTO
cases did not reach the point of formal briefing and argumentation before a WTO
panel. At this early stage, a general reference to the norm, without a more detailed
explanation of it or invocation of a specific variant, was possibly more likely to meet
with dissension than acceptance. This would help explain the norm's general existence
despite criticisms of the US stance.
Third, the WTO cases in particular suggest the relevance of obvious (or
perceived) pretext in a state's rhetoric in relation to the acceptance of a norms
invocation by other actors. The US invocation of the VTO security exception in the
Helms-Burton case was widely perceived as a pretext, while in the Burma case, the
gravity of the US human rights concerns was viewed as genuine. The United States,
by employing the security threat to defend Helms-Burton along with a panoply of
other proffered arguments, compromised the integrity of its position and obscured the
validity of the particular human rights-security component of its claim. This
experience subsequently affected the nature of the response to the US invocation of
the human rights-security claim in the Burma case, given that many actors and
commentators had argued against the same invocation in the Helms-Burton context.
Notably, in the Burma case, the response by transnational actors was split. Some
35. See id at 334 ([E]ven when ideas that constitute identities and interests are not changing, they are
being continually reinforced in interaction.).
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organizations in Europe criticized the European Commission's WTO petition against
the United States as "condoning 'crimes against humanity,"" and European
Commission spokespersons were careful to remind naysayers of Western Europe's
own ongoing efforts to sanction Burmas government. At bottom the conflict was
really about the secondary effects of the US trade measure on European companies,
not the ultimate purpose of the US act. The principled motivations of the
Massachusetts polity in passing the law gave the US stance a different hue. It spoke
directly to the third variant of the human rights-security link. One might wonder
whether the international response to the US invocation would have been different if
the Burma case arose before Helms-Burton.
Finally, while a violation of a norm does not deny its general existence, if
constructivist accounts are to succeed, measurements of a norm's depth and durability
must be developed. Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro explain:
To argue that certain norms are influential is to suggest that their effects vary with
their strength.... But by what criteria can one assess norm robustness .... [Tjhe
chore is complicated by the widely accepted notion that some behavioral violations
of norms do not necessarily invalidate the norms. At a certain point violations clearly
do begin to undermine norms. But how do we assess that point?3
This essay suggests a few factors that could be useful in determining a norm's
strength. First, observed continuities in the norm's expression and invocation may
serve as an indicator of its strength. Express and implicit references to the norm in
agreements, texts, statements of intent, declarations of principles, or programs of
action are part of this test for continuity. Second, regularized patterns of behavior in
accord with the norm can serve as another measurement. In this regard, one should
examine not only actions the norm helps produce but also those it helps constrain. For
example, the United States' eventual action in Rwanda, and now Sierra Leone, can be
36. Angus MacKinnon, EU Accused of Condoning "Pariah" Burma with WTO Action, Agence France
Presse (Sept 21, 1998).
37. Id. At the time, the European Parliament also adopted a Resolution criticizing the European
Commission's position before the WTO, stating7
The European Parliament...
2- Calls again on the Burmese Government to guarantee the fundamental rights of the
Burmese people... ;
3. Believes that, in the interest of a foreign policy founded upon the principles of human
rights and democracy, the scope of the VITO to take these principles into account
should be enlarged rather than restricted and calls upon the European Union to use its
weight as the biggest trading power of the world to this end;
4. Criticises in this context the Commission decision to insist on a conflict resolution
panel within WTO over the law of the US State of Massachusetts.
European Parliament, Resolution on Burma, (Sept 17, 1998) available online at <http://www3.
europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/pv22PRG=CALEND&APP=PV2&:ANGUE=EN&TPV=
DEF&FILE=980917> (visited Mar 25, 2001).
38. See Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise, in
Katzenstein, Culture of National Security, 451, 484 (cited in note 28).
'1of. 2 No. I
Wforms and2'(ationafSecuriy
taken as motivated in part by the third variant of the human rights-security norm
rather than by any national self-interest. At the same time, the initial unwillingness of
the United States to recognize the Rwanda massacres as a genocide and the limits on
international criticism of the US actions in protection of Iraqi Kurds both-not so
strangely-indicate constraints imposed by the norm." Finally, the degree of
institutionalization may be a third indicator of a norm's strength. Instances of the
human rights-security norm's institutionalization include the creation and capacities
of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, the project designs
included in the South Eastern Europe Stability Pact, and the human rights mandates
of UN peacekeeping operations in post-humanitarian crises. In sum, all three of these
indicators-continuities in expressions and invocations, regularized patterns of
behavior, and institutionalization-may be used to gauge and falsify claims made
about a norm's strength or embeddedness.
V. CONCLUSION
This essay started from the conventional view that national security exceptions
simply allow states to opt out of international obligations and that an invocation of
such an exception accordingly represents a retreat from international norms. The
WTO experience serves as an important testing ground for this view given the recent
controversies over US practices. I have argued that, along one dimension, the US
position-the stance that severe human rights violations constitute a threat to
security interests-accords with and furthers emergent international norms.
This analysis contains large and small lessons. In terms of the WTO dispute
itself, the analysis argues against those who suggest measures taken in response to
severe human rights violations cannot constitute a national security interest under
Article XXI. In terms of broader theoretical implications, the analysis suggests a
dimension along which invocation of such a national security exception may reflect
and contribute to international norms. These broader theoretical implications are an
important part of understanding the significance of cases such as the WTO
controversy in terms of international normative developments. In that regard, this
essay is intended to suggest avenues for resolving quandaries about how state practice
and norms operate more generally.
39. In terms of the Rwanda case, constraints were to operate on the US government once it offially
recognized the genocide and thus constraints also operated on the governments w.ingness and
ability to issue that recognition.
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